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1 This paper is the English translation of two paragraphs (V and VI) of the fourth chapter 
of my book Experiencia y creatividad en C. S. Peirce y M. Merleau-Ponty (2016), which sums 
up the results of my Ph.D. Dissertation “Los bordes de la experiencia creativa en C. S. 
Peirce y M. Merleau-Ponty” (2016). 
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Resumo  
Le primat de la perception et ses 
conséquences philosophiques (1946) é a 
transcrição do debate que Merleau-
Ponty teve em dia 23 de novembro 
de 1946, na Société française de 
Philosophie, em relação aos 
resultados da Phénoménologie de la 
perception (1945). Merleau-Ponty 
aponta ao fato de que a percepção 
não é um objetivo intellectual, mas a 
síntese prática que implica o 
movimento do corpo, como a origem 
da experiência perceptive do 
mundo.  
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Abstract 
Le primat de la perception et ses 
conséquences philosophiques (1946) is 
the transcription of the discussion 
that Merleau-Ponty had on 
November 23, 1946, at the Société 
française de Philosophie on the results 
of Phénoménologie de la perception 
(1945). Merleau-Ponty states that 
perception is not an intellectual but a 
practical synthesis that implies the 
movement of the body, as the origin 
of the perceptual experience of the 
world. 
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1. The practical Primacy of Perception. 
 
Le primat de la perception et ses conséquences philosophiques (1946)1 is 
the transcription of the discussion that Merleau-Ponty had on November 
23, 1946, at the Société française de Philosophie on the results of 
Phénoménologie de la perception (1945). The starting point of the discussion is 
Merleau-Ponty’s thesis according to which the perceived world implies a 
certain type of relationships that have been unknown to the psychologist 
and the philosopher for a long time. If we consider the objects that remain 
outside our visual field, such as those located behind us, or rather the 
invisible profiles, interior or posterior, of a perceived thing, how can the 
existence of these hidden objects or the indirect perception of these 
invisible aspects of the object be described? “How should we describe the 
                                         
1 From now on I will quote Merleau-Ponty’s works with the following abbreviations: [SB] 
The Structure of Behavior. Boston: Beacon Press (1963); [PRI] The Primacy of Perception and 
Its Philosophical Consequences. Evanston: Nothwestern Universtity Press (1964); [PP] 
Phenomenology of Perception. London and New York: Routledge (2005).  
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existence of these absent objects or the non-visible parts of present 
objects?” (PRI: 13).   
Psychologists consider this class of hidden objects or absent profiles 
as representations of fantasy, imagination or memory and, concisely, as 
objects with a mental or purely possible existence, but not actual. And 
nevertheless, if these invisible aspects are mere representations, they are 
not supposed to be perceived as existing because the represented object is 
not perceived as a presence: it is as if it were existing but it is not, being 
purely possible. These invisible aspects are not mere representations of 
fantasy, but profiles co-perceived and placed behind what is seen, and that 
is evident for at least two reasons. First of all, the profile seen is the profile-
of an object, that is to say, it is a part of an already given whole, which is 
the object itself. Therefore, what is first learned by perception is the unity 
and wholeness of the thing perceived in its present and absent fragments, 
and not a sum of present profiles added to absent representations. If it 
were not possible to grasp the whole object at first glance, it would be 
impossible to distinguish its parts after. Secondly, it is evident that these 
invisible fragments exist behind what is perceived directly and are not 
imaginary representations, because I can move towards them with my 
vision or touch: “but since the unseen sides of this lamp are not imaginary, 
but only hidden from view (to see them it suffices to move the lamp a little 
bit), I cannot say that they are representations” (PRI: 13-4). 
Now, having excluded the fantastic and imaginary nature of the 
invisible aspects of the object, how should they be considered? Should 
they be considered as the necessary anticipations or deductions of the 
geometric definition of the perceived object? For instance, the front sides 
of a cube could be observed and afterwards the existence of the back sides 
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could be deduced from its geometrical definition: a body formed by six 
square sides, congruent and arranged in parallel. On the basis of this 
definition, I could anticipate how the unseen sides might be perceived by 
surrounding or touching the cube with my hands. Thus, I could state 
through geometry that those absent profiles would exist and become 
present to me according to a necessary geometrical law: “if, for example, I 
look at a cube, knowing the structure of the cube as it is defined in 
geometry, I can anticipate the perceptions which this cube will give me 
while I move around it. Under this hypothesis I would know the unseen 
side as the necessary consequence of a certain law of the development of 
my perception” (PRI: 14). In summary, the totality and unity of the 
perceived object would depend on an a priori and intellectual judgment on 
it — the geometric definition — and its perception would consist in the 
mere verification, confirmed or denied, of the hypothesis previously 
given. This conception of perception is characteristic of science: the 
percept is a mosaic of stimuli organized in a form by a hypothesis-
definition formulated by a judgment. A sensory stimulus raises a 
perception that develops according to a necessary form established by a 
law of the intellect: first comes the stimulus that causes a perception to 
which the scientific formalization is thereafter applied. This is not the way 
in which Merleau-Ponty conceives the primacy of perception. What meaning 
should be attributed to this expression? To begin with, it is worth 
mentioning that Merleau-Ponty regards science’s view of perception as 
completely inadequate: “I have said that the point of view of the scientist 
with respect to perception—a stimulus en soi which produces a 
perception—is, like all forms of naive realism, absolutely insufficient. 
Philosophically, I do not believe that this image of perception is ultimately 
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defensible” (PRI: 38-9).  
Merleau-Ponty is convinced that it is not possible for the existence 
of the inaccessible aspects of direct perception to be generated by a 
judgment of the intellect: the statement It is true that the front side always 
implies the back one does not make the invisible visible. This formulation 
expressed by the judgment It is true does not correspond to what is given 
in my perception, which does not offer me geometrical truths about the 
object, but its presence in flesh and blood: “but this formula, It is true, does 
not correspond to what is given to me in perception. Perception does not 
give me truths like geometry but presences” (PRI: 14). The hidden profile 
of the object is present and close to me according to a certain style and it is 
not merely a possible perception or an intellectual synthesis that 
reproduces its invisible existence beyond the visible one: “thus I should 
not say that the unseen sides of objects are simply possible perceptions, 
nor that they are the necessary conclusions of a kind of analysis or 
geometrical reasoning” (PRI: 14).  
It is important to clarify now in what sense Merleau-Ponty speaks 
about the primacy of perception. In answering this question, it is 
opportune to consider that the perceived object is given as present in all its 
visible and invisible aspects; the judgment of the intellect does not 
transform the apparent sensations of perception into the objective truths of 
science; the values of the world of culture are not false feelings, calculated 
by scientific or philosophical reason, or by reflection in general: “by these 
words, the primacy of perception, we mean that the experience of perception 
is our presence at the moment when things, truths, values are constituted 
for us” (PRI: 25). To talk about the primacy of perception does not mean 
putting sensations before the formal structures of judgment, as empiricism 
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asserts. In fact, the intellect does not reconstruct a posteriori what is lacking 
in perception because there is nothing lacking: as expressed before, the 
object is given as present for me in its totality. 
In any case, perception does not merely record the sensory stimuli 
that thought reconstructs thereafter in a mosaic of sensations, forming the 
perceived object. My organism is perceiving and at the same time 
interpreting those same stimuli, conferring on them, without any 
intellectual mediation, a certain perceptive configuration or form: “we see 
clearly why perception is not a phenomenon of the order of physical 
causality. We observe a response of the organism which interprets the 
stimuli and gives them a certain configuration” (PRI: 39). Thus, it is 
evident that perception is not a phenomenon belonging to the order of 
physical causality. In fact, as Ariela Battán states, “Merleau-Ponty instead 
of addressing the stimuli to determine in the sum of its parts the reason for 
this or that behavior, goes to the organism to verify its functioning. By 
taking as a point of support the organism can capture the diversity of the 
reaction in all its forms, and thus raise the insufficiency of linear causality 
as an explanatory resource”2 (2004: 72-3). Perception is not caused or 
produced by certain stimuli, but rather the perceiving organism responds 
to them behaving in a certain way according to a precise perceptive style: 
“to me it seems impossible to hold that this configuration is produced by 
the stimuli. It comes from the organism and from the behavior of the 
organism in their presence” (PRI: 39).  
                                         
2 My translation: “Merleau-Ponty en lugar de dirigirse a los estímulos para determinar en 
la sumatoria de sus partes la razón de tal o cual comportamiento, va al organismo a 
verificar su funcionamiento. Al tomar como punto de apoyo el organismo puede captar la 
diversidad de la reacción en todas sus formas, y plantear así la insuficiencia de la 
causalidad lineal como recurso explicativo”. 
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Initially, it is reasonable to talk about the primacy of perception 
because perception has the privilege of making me aware of the perceived 
object in its nascent stage. In other texts, Merleau-Ponty defines perception 
as the primary experience of knowledge (connaissance) in which the co-birth 
(con-naissance) of the perceived object occurs: “the experience of perception 
is our presence at the moment when things, truths, values are constituted 
for us; that perception is a nascent logos; that it teaches us, outside all 
dogmatism, the true conditions of objectivity itself” (PRI: 25). Perception 
teaches me the real conditions of the appearance of the percept’s 
objectivity, revealing to me its being in its nascent stage and thus avoids 
reducing it to a mere sensation. Then, the perceived object is by definition 
present and living, and perception gives me back its being in such a way 
that it is possible to apply it to human relationships in order to create a 
new system of values — that is, a culture. It is not a matter of pointing out 
the perceptual experience as the primordial stage from which the world of 
culture is derived through a process of transformation or evolution of 
perception itself, but a matter of pointing out the level of experience that 
reveals the background of the problem that culture attempts to solve: “we 
call this level of experience primordial — not to assert that everything else 
derives from it by transformations and evolution […] but rather that it 
reveals to us the permanent data of the problem which culture attempts to 
resolve” (PRI: 25).  
In the article The Return to Perceptual Experience and the Meaning of 
the Primacy of Perception (1989), Theodore Geraets states that in the 
primordial experience of perception, objects are given as nascent processes 
that are as yet incomplete and have not yet been transformed into rigid 
and unmoving matter: “in this primordial experience everything is revealed 
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as a meaning in the process of being born, which is to say that it is not yet 
completely finished, and has not as yet hardened and become unmoving” 
(1989: 33). That is why perception, according to Geraets, has the double 
privilege of unveiling the nascent conditions of the appearance of the 
present and living percept and the sensory data of knowledge on which it is 
feasible to construct a culture: “this twofold privilege, that of presence 
(living and present being) and that of being the foundation (the data and 
conditions)” (1989: 33). In other words, perception offers me an object 
whose sensory matter has already been impregnated with its living form: 
“[that] the matter of perception be pregnant with its form” (PRI: 15). 
However, although Merleau-Ponty himself affirms that perceptive 
experience constitutes the first stage of knowledge, he does not assert that 
culture can be reduced to the field of perception: “I did not mean to say 
that culture consists in perceiving. There is a whole cultural world which 
constitutes a second level above perceptual experience. Perception is 
rather the fundamental basis which cannot be ignored” (PRI: 33).  
Therefore, what kind of primacy does perceptual experience play in 
relation to the world of culture? It is relevant to consider that perception, 
through the interpretation and configuration of sensory stimuli, 
establishes with the world of culture an above-all practical primacy and 
only in second place a theoretical-reflexive one. In effect, in response to the 
stimuli received, the organism does not produce the perceptual 
configuration of the object according to a physical causality. On the 
contrary, this configuration derives from the organism itself and from the 
type of practical response, or behavior, that it acts in the presence of these 
stimuli: “it comes from the organism and from the behavior of the 
organism in their presence” (PRI: 39). The organism is never completely 
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passive before the perceived data: it does not limit itself to capturing the 
stimuli like an external recording camera that, distancing itself from the 
sensory world, catches them in their objectivity. 
As previously explained, perception implies an interpretative 
behavior of the stimuli received that creates a culture, and reflection is an 
acquisition of this culture that does not suppress the relationships with the 
sensory world. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty states that in the perceptual 
experience, the root of each act, whether theoretical or practical, can be 
found in relation to human behavior: “reciprocally one could say that in a 
completely explicitated human perception we would find all the 
originalities of human life” (PRI: 40). Even those theoretical acts, such as 
imagination or ideation, which at first glance distance themselves from the 
sensory world to produce a world of cultural values, are characterized by 
the same creative and interpretative capacity that springs from and 
operates at the level of perceptual experience: “the same creative capacity 
which is at work in imagination and in ideation is present, in germ, in the 
first human perception” (PRI: 40).  
Briefly, while it is true that man is capable of interpreting, 
transforming his life with the purpose of creating a cultural second-level 
world, he never leaves the cradle of sensory experience: “[we] have only 
replaced it [the subject] in the bed of the perceptible, which it transforms 
without ever quitting it” (PRI: 25). Although the perceptual consciousness 
is able to detach itself from the sensory world without ever abandoning it, 
there is still a blind spot in it, a limit that escapes from the perceptual 
consciousness itself and its vision of the world. Consciousness never 
possesses the world and itself totally, but through a residue or limit of the 
vision that belongs to it structurally, and that is the phenomenological 
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condition of the being of the world and of its being in the world. 
Moreover, this is the difference between a phenomenological philosophy 
and a philosophy of the intellect by which the object is an absolute 
presence without gaps and without horizon: “but the essential difference 
between my point of view and that of a philosophy of the understanding 
is that, in my view, even though consciousness is able to detach itself from 
things to see itself, human consciousness never possesses itself in complete 
detachment […]. Taking up a saying from Rimbaud, I said that there is a 
center of consciousness by which we are not in the world” (PRI: 40-1). 
 
2. The Perceptual Synthesis 
 
The operation that recognizes the existence of what is not given 
directly through perception is not an intellectual but a practical synthesis, 
a being-in-the-world that implies a certain behavior and tacit body 
gestures. In fact, as Renaud Barbaras states, “the study of behavior reveals 
rather what Merleau-Ponty already calls an existence, a being-in-the-
world, a tacit relation to a presence rather than a possession of something 
in a representation (2004: 5). To give an example, it is possible for me to 
touch the invisible side of an object by following with my hands the lines 
suggested by the visible side or simply by pointing my hands towards the 
hidden part: “I can touch the lamp, and not only the side turned toward 
me but also the other side; I have only to extend my hand to hold it” (PRI: 
14). The classic analysis of perception reduces sensory experience to the 
level of empirical proof, considering it as the only and really existing level. 
However, when I am aware of the context that surrounds me, I consider 
my being-in-the-world, my position in space and my own point of view, 
and see more of what I actually see. 
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As noted above, the organism never records merely sensory data 
through its vision, for instance, simply a house or a street, but it sees the 
object already characterized by certain properties that derive from 
consideration of the surrounding environment: a country house or a 
building, an urban street or a mountain path: “I perceive before me a road 
or a house, and I perceive them as having a certain dimension: the road 
may be a country road or a national highway; the house may be a shanty 
or a manor” (PRI: 14). In addition, the things observed show themselves to 
be already configured and characterized by certain dimensions and colors 
that are determined by a practical relationship with the perceived object. 
The true dimensions and true colors of the perceived object, which 
actually differ from their apparent size and color, can be recovered only 
through a kinetic and tactile interaction involving the observer’s 
corporeality: “these identifications presuppose that I recognize the true 
size of the object, quite different from that which appears to me from the 
point at which I am standing” (PRI: 14). 
It is widely believed that the real features of an object, such as size 
or color, can be derived from the analysis of its perceived appearances. So 
the real and objective size of the things observed should be established 
starting from their apparent size and through the mediation of the 
intellect. According to Merleau-Ponty, this procedure is not exact, mainly 
because it does not describe my perceptual experience. In fact, “the 
apparent size of which we are speaking is not perceived by me” (PRI: 14). 
This statement is so correct that to obtain the apparent size of one thing I 
should assume the existence of an objective and true visual field, 
prefabricated by the intellect and in which the size of the thing is 
perceived as apparent. However, such a visual field does not occur in the 
VIS 
Revista do Programa de Pós-graduação em Arte da UnB 
VIS 
Revista do Programa de Pós-graduação em Arte da UnB 
V. 16, nº1/janeiro-junho de 2017 
Brasília 
ISSN- 1518-5494 
ISSN (versão eletrônica): 2447-2484 
307 
immediate perceptual experience, but is given as a result of an intellectual 
construction determined by necessary laws. Thus, when someone states 
that they perceive an object according to a deformed perspective or that 
they see its apparent size or color, they are already reducing the 
perceptual experience to the laws of geometrical perspective. It is even 
historically verifiable that the geometrical perspective of the visual field is 
not a necessary condition for perceiving a world of objects: “It is a 
remarkable fact that the uninstructed have no awareness of perspective 
and that it took a long time and much reflection for men to become aware 
of a perspectival deformation of objects” (PRI: 14-5).  
The separation between apparent and true properties of the 
perceived object happens only after the perceptual act: it happens after the 
intellect has broken down the whole object into its parts and considers it 
as a mere accumulation of signs or a mosaic of sensations with no direct 
relation to their meaning. Perception does not offer signs that must later 
be deciphered and brought back to their meaning through an intellectual 
inference, because in perceptual experience, signs and meaning are not 
given separately: “thus there is no deciphering, no mediate inference from 
the sign to what is signified, because the alleged signs are not given to me 
separately from what they signify” (PRI: 15). Signs are always signs-of a 
meaning that precedes them and the apparent size is simply an isolated 
and abstract sign of an a posteriori meaning: the true size of geometric 
space. In the same way as the true size of an object does not derive from 
an analysis of geometric space occupied by it, neither is its true color 
deduced from that of the surrounding environment or how it is lit up. By 
way of illustration, if sunlight fills an environment during the day, the 
yellow of the artificial light would be perceived as a factor that alters the 
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true chromatic configuration of the objects present in the environment. 
However, at sundown things will appear illuminated only by artificial 
light and their yellow will not be perceived as an altering factor, but as the 
background or the necessary condition that enables them to be seen. In 
short, the true color is not deduced from a chromatic analysis of the 
different profiles of the perceived object or by taking into account the type 
of lighting that characterizes the environment. In fact, it appears when it 
fades away: “the true color thus is not deduced, taking account of the 
lighting, because it appears precisely when daylight disappears” (PRI: 15).  
What philosophical consequences do these considerations have? 
First, it should be observed, as mentioned above, that if the perceived 
object is a whole that precedes its parts, it is impossible to break it down 
into its elementary data and later reconstruct it, without denaturalizing it. 
Next, if the true color of an object does not derive from an a posteriori 
composition of its different chromatic aspects, or from an intellectual 
abstraction that separates natural and artificial illumination, perhaps I can 
affirm that the size and color familiar to me — not true or apparent, but 
familiar — are circumscribed from and through the point of view of my 
body, as the origin of the perceptive and practical field of possible 
behaviors: “This subject, which takes a point of view, is my body as the 
field of perception and action [pratique]—in so far as my gestures have a 
certain reach and circumscribe as my domain the whole group of objects 
familiar to me” (PRI: 16). The most important philosophical consequence, 
then, is that if perception recognizes the totality of the object immediately 
and prior to its possible decompositions without any conceptual 
mediation, the perceived object is not a mosaic of parts captured by the 
gaze and synthesized by a conceptual meaning: “we observe at once that it 
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is impossible, as has often been said, to decompose a perception, to make 
it into a collection of sensations, because in it the whole is prior to the 
parts—and this whole is not an ideal whole. The meaning which I 
ultimately discover is not of the conceptual order” (PRI: 15).  
Now, it is appropriate to consider that if the meaning of the object 
perceived were a concept, how could it be recognized in sensory 
experience? An intermediate element would be necessary between the 
sensory level and the conceptual knowledge, and then another mediation 
for intermediaries: it would be an infinite process that brings our memory 
to the old Aristotelian argument of the third man. Instead, “it is necessary 
that meaning and signs, the form and matter of perception, be related 
from the beginning and that, as we say, the matter of perception be 
pregnant with its form” (PRI: 15).  
 
3. The Ambiguous Structure of Perception 
 
One of the fundamental characteristics of perception directed to the 
external world is its continuous ambition to do something that, 
structurally, is not capable of doing. In what sense? What does perception 
offer me and how does its object show itself? Above all, the objects of 
perception are given through certain perspectives, profiles, gaps, fissures 
and boundaries that are unseen to my direct sight: the visibility of certain 
aspects of what is perceived also implies the invisibility of others. Thus, if 
the absent or invisible profiles lie in the same structure of the perceived 
object, the perception of an object does not consist in purely asserting its 
existence, but also in its negation, since the sensory object gives itself, in 
some way, by withdrawing. The percept’s ways of giving are not 
defective, but rather are the only ones that allow me to perceive the object 
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in its effective corporeality. As Luca Vanzago points out: “Merleau-Ponty, 
following Husserl, affirms that the only existential modality of the 
perceptive consciousness is its perspectivism”3 (2012: 28). 
The way in which the perceived object gives itself in perspective is 
not generated by a failure of the perceptual system. Even the perceptual 
consciousness does not realize the perspectivism of the sensory object as a 
cognitive obstacle or an imperfection related to the existence of one’s 
body: “but in immediate consciousness this perspectival character of my 
knowledge is not conceived as an accident in its regard, as an imperfection 
relative to the existence of my body and its proper point of view” (SB: 
286). On the contrary, perspective does not appear as a subjective 
deformation of perceived objects, but as the essential condition for them to 
be visible. In addition, knowledge by profiles is not a downgrade in true 
knowledge, but a revelation of the hidden and inexhaustible richness of 
the perceived object, which finally appears as a thing. Thus, for example, 
the profiles of my desk do not appear directly to my perceptual 
consciousness as worthless appearances, but as appearances-of my desk. 
Each aspect shows something and refers to something else without 
exhausting the existence of the whole thing I see. In fact, “the things which 
I see are things for me only under the condition that they always recede 
beyond their immediately given aspects” (PRI: 16). The perceived object, 
receding continually beyond what can be seen, transcends its appearance 
and emerges as a thing for me, a phenomenon that provokes a questioning 
in the perceiver. According to Merleau-Ponty, “there is a paradox of 
immanence and transcendence in perception. Immanence, because the 
                                         
3 My translation: “seguendo lo  Husserl  delle  Idee,  Merleau-Ponty insiste sul fatto che la 
coscienza percettiva é questo o non é”. 
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perceived object cannot be foreign to him who perceives; transcendence, 
because it always contains something more than what is actually given” 
(PRI: 16).   
The phenomenological structure of the perceived object is 
ambiguous: on the one hand the percept exists in itself insofar as its 
content transcends my perception, and on the other it is something for me 
as it is only given in flesh and blood, through aspects immanent and 
embodied in the perceiver. So, the relationship between the aspects given 
to me and the ones given in the percept itself is paradoxical: these aspects are 
unable to constitute the whole thing, and yet it is that very thing which 
reveals itself through and beyond all these aspects. Thus, the object of 
perceptual consciousness is configured as a paradoxical intertwinement of 
present and absent aspects: “these two elements of perception are not, 
properly speaking, contradictory. […] The appearance of something, 
requires both this presence and this absence” (PRI: 16). In other words, the 
thing is real and exists in flesh and blood only by donating itself through its 
deformed perspectives through the point of view of the corporeal subject 
perceiving it. Those profiles which are present to me announce the whole 
thing in itself without exhausting it: the visible aspects of a thing are not 
signs indicating its invisible meaning, but each profile is given, already 
impregnated with its whole form. In short, perception is structurally 
ambiguous and paradoxically intertwined by materially visible and 
formally invisible aspects. However, it is interesting to note that neither 
the empiricist conception of perception, which reduces the object to a 
mosaic of sensations that derive from the succession of states of 
consciousness, nor intellectualism, which attempts to logically organize 
sensations through judgment, has grasped the underlying ambiguity that 
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structurally characterizes perception: “neither the sequence of states of 
consciousness nor the logical organization of thought accounts for 
perception” (SB: 187).  
Merleau-Ponty contradicts empiricism by arguing that the percept 
exceeds its sensory appearances: a cube is not reduced to what can be seen 
of it, as it is not possible to observe more than three sides at a time. In 
addition, the given profiles are structurally and reciprocally 
representative: the sides of a cube, as sides-of, refer to the whole of the 
object without necessarily implying an external relationship juxtaposed to 
them. Nor is the logical organization operated by an intellectual judgment 
able to justify the structure of perception. Such kind of organization would 
suppose the existence of a mind that contains its own object, 
corresponding to the perceived thing. However, the unity of the object 
does not derive from the correspondence of the perceived aspects to a 
mental meaning: the concordant multiplicity of sensory data is organized 
and configured autonomously. In order to account for the direct 
experience of the perceived object and not to reduce it to mere empirical 
data or to an intellectual concept, it is necessary to consider the percept as 
an entity in perspective: “thus, to do justice to our direct experience of 
things it would be necessary to maintain at the same time, against 
empiricism, that they are beyond their sensible manifestations and, against 
intellectualism, that they are not unities in the order of judgment, that they 
are embodied in their apparitions. The things in naive experience are 
evident as perspectival beings” (SB: 187). Things give themselves through 
the mediation of their profiles, which reveal their ambiguous and 
paradoxical structure, insofar as the unity of the percept transcends its 
VIS 
Revista do Programa de Pós-graduação em Arte da UnB 
VIS 
Revista do Programa de Pós-graduação em Arte da UnB 
V. 16, nº1/janeiro-junho de 2017 
Brasília 
ISSN- 1518-5494 
ISSN (versão eletrônica): 2447-2484 
313 
sensory appearances, giving and embodying itself in them. So the object is 
“a transcendence which is nevertheless open to my knowledge” (SB: 187).   
 
 
4. The Universal Style of Perception 
 
As previously discussed, because of the ambiguity of the perceived 
object, it is impossible to reconstruct the percept by aggregating its 
profiles, and that the synthesis uniting them is practical and not 
intellectual. The intellectual synthesis only gives me possible objects, such 
as those represented by the imagination, or absolutely necessary and 
completely visible objects without shadows, such as the ideal figures of 
geometry. On the other hand, the object in flesh and blood is never merely a 
possible or necessary one, but is given to me deformed by the indefinite 
series of perspectives that derive from my point of view. Only under these 
conditions is it possible to define it as real. “What prohibits me from 
treating my perception as an intellectual act is that an intellectual act 
would grasp the object either as possible or as necessary. But in perception 
it is real; it is given as the infinite sum of an indefinite series of perspectival 
views in each of which the object is given but in none of which is it given 
exhaustively. It is not accidental for the object to be given to me in a 
deformed way, from the point of view [place] which I occupy. That is the 
price of its being real” (PRI: 15-6). It is possible to say that the perceptual 
synthesis, in its ambiguous and paradoxical structure, grounds the reality 
of the objects. However, under what conditions can perceptual synthesis 
be generated? Merleau-Ponty considers that the reality of the object is 
given only from this deforming perception, embodied by a point of view 
situated in a precise position. Perception does not simply put me in 
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contact with the perceived object, but through my body it presents the 
object to me, constantly carrying me beyond it. Each aspect of the 
perceived thing represents another successive one in a never-ending 
practical synthesis, and which consists in a movement from the present 
and given sensory aspect to the potentially co-given one.  
Furthermore, perceptual synthesis not only perceives the object as 
intertwined relationships of present and absent aspects, but also positions 
it on the horizon of all possible relationships: the world. In particular, 
perception not only evokes or represents what is currently inaccessible 
from my point of view, but rather proclaims it to be visible from another 
position or horizon. In this sense, perception acts a synthesis of horizon that, 
through my point of view, introduces me to the whole world. However, 
the synthesis of horizon is not a synthesis that makes me imagine all 
possible landscapes. The synthesis of horizon does not represent anything, 
but opens up all the possible landscapes that are “already there in the 
harmonious sequence and infinite unfolding of their perspectives” (PP: 
384). My particular point of view does not limit my experience but indeed 
it is the privileged mode through which I am open to the totality of the 
natural world as the horizon of all horizons, the style of all styles. Thanks 
to my perceptive field I am present in the world around me and I co-belong 
to all the other landscapes that extend beyond my perspective. At the same 
time, this possibility of locating everything that transcends my perceptual 
vision is merely intentional and not effective. The landscape I see can 
announce to me what is lying behind the hill with a certain degree of 
indeterminacy. In this case, the only thing I am sure of with respect to its 
indeterminate remoteness is that there is something beyond what can be 
perceived in an abstract style. 
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It is evident then, that beyond the present and perceived aspects of 
the object, on its internal and external horizon, there is a co-presence of co-
perceived aspects. As an example, “when I see the bright green of one of 
Cézanne’s vases, it does not make me think of pottery, it presents it to me. 
The pottery is there, with its thin, smooth outer surface and its porous 
inside, in the particular way in which the green varies in shade” (PP: 384-
5). However, all these given and co-given aspects are presented with the 
same perceptual style that ensures the unity of my experience of the 
object. Its unity is given and not built a posteriori, and is guaranteed by the 
natural world that is the horizon of all horizons, or the universal style of 
all possible perceptions. The correlate of the natural world, as the practical 
system of all perceptual visions of the world, is the body. For Merleau-
Ponty the body is defined as that subject who embodies a point of view as 
a blind spot and origin of the perceptual field and of our possible 
behaviors. As Rossella Prezzo says: “what I see in perception is that, above 
all, things are presented to me and that I am present before them, in a 
mutual involvement, through that connection with the being that is my 
body”4 (2004: 8). The body, with its sensory functions, circumscribes the 
perceptual field, and the object is an open totality whose reality is 
accessible only through the potentially infinite series of perceptual 
syntheses that concord with a certain style of self-giving by the object 
itself, that is the world. In conclusion, perception makes something 
present by situating it in a world — which is the totality of objects and the 
universal style of each possible perception — through the corporeal 
synthesis that reconfigures every detail on the correct perceptual horizon: 
                                         
4 My translation: “io che vedo, nella percezione, è innanzitutto che le cose  mi  si  
presentano  e  che  io  sono  presente  alle  cose,  in  una  mutua  implicazione,  attraverso  
quella giuntura con l’essere che é il mio corpo”.  
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“to perceive is to render oneself present to something through the body. 
All the while the thing keeps its place within the horizon of the world, and 
the structuration consists in putting each detail in the perceptual horizons 
which belong to it. But such formulas are just so many enigmas unless we 
relate them to the concrete developments which they summarize” (PRI: 
42). 
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